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Nils-Frederic Wagner takes issue with my argument that influential critics of 
“transplant” thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that the 
mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I have 
not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought 
experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored 
important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. I argue that 
my case still stands and that transplant thought experiments can do damage to rivals of a 




Nils-Frederic Wagner (2016)1 takes issue with my argument (Beck 2014) that influential 
critics of ‘transplant’ thought experiments make two cardinal mistakes. He responds that 
the mistakes I identify are not mistakes at all. The mistakes are rather on my part, in that I 
have not taken into account the conceptual genesis of personhood, that my view of thought 
experiments is idiosyncratic and possibly self-defeating, and in that I have ignored 
important empirical evidence about the relationship between brains and minds. Once all of 
these are taken into account, the case that I have suggested in support of these thought 
experiments and a psychological continuity theory (PCT) of personal identity disappears, 
and what emerges is a case for its rivals—especially the one I highlighted for criticism, 
Marya Schechtman’s Person Life View. 
 
Transplant thought experiments are those in which the cerebrum of one individual is 
envisaged as being successfully transplanted into the “decerebrated” body of another. They 
have often been taken as central to the case for showing the PCT to be correct, in that we 
respond that we would go along with our cerebrum and psychology into a new body. This 
intuitive response is consistent with how that theory explains identity—as a matter of 
overlapping psychological connections forming the continuity that marks personal 
persistence. My focus on such thought experiments was not because I see them as crucial to 
supporting the theory of personal identity that I think comes closest to getting things right. 
Rather, it was because they seemed to be most suited to meeting the demands of critics of 
thought experiments (and that theory) in the personal identity debate. In fact, the ones on 
                                                          
1 All references to Wagner are to this paper. 
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which I focused were ones proposed by those critics themselves. When everything else is 
said, these are ones they are prepared to consider. I am persuaded that Locke’s old story of 
the prince and the cobbler reveals important things about the concept of personal identity,2 
but others have told me that they could not grasp what Locke was asking them to imagine. So 
I focused on thought experiments that appeared much easier to imagine. Since they were 
the products of the critics’ imagination, I hoped to put that complaint aside. 
 
They were of even more interest as it seemed to me that, once some methodological points 
were understood, they could do damage to the theories favoured by some of those critics. 
 
The “Two Mistakes” 
The mistakes I identified were in the thought of Kathleen Wilkes, Bernard Williams and 
(more recently) Marya Schechtman. Wilkes focuses on fission thought experiments rather 
than transplant- type ones, but her arguments can be easily applied to the latter as well. She 
objects that they require us to make predictions that we are in no position to make. The 
thought experiments posit worlds utterly unlike our own and then require us to predict how 
our concepts would operate (“what we would say”) if we existed under those conditions. To 
do that, though, we would need to know all sorts of things that we cannot possibly know: 
 
It is obviously and essentially relevant to the purposes of this thought experiment to know 
such things as: how often? Is it predictable? Or sometimes predictable and sometimes not, 
like dying? Can it be prevented? Just as obviously, the background society, against which we 
set the phenomenon is now mysterious. Does it have such institutions as marriage? How 
could that work? Or universities? It would be difficult, to say the least, if universities doubled 
in size every few days, or weeks, or years. Are pregnant women debarred from splitting? 
The entire background here is incomprehensible (Wilkes 1988, 11, emphasis in the original). 
 
That sounds at first like a reasonable response, but it seemed to me to include some 
strange thinking. The point of thought experiments that ask what we would say is to find 
out what we ultimately believe about something—the implicit conditions underlying our 
application of a concept. That is, they attempt to test our deep commitments—which 
roughly correspond to the necessary conditions for our application of a concept. Many 
conditions will be met in such an application, but we are more committed to some than to 
others; we find out which by separating usually co-instantiated conditions. That is what 
counterfactual scenarios are meant to achieve: we are faced with a scenario in which some 
usual condition no longer obtains and asked to consider whether our concept still applies. 
 
But if that is so, we are not being asked for a prediction about what concept people would 
have if conditions were to change. That is, we are not being asked what we would say if we 
were to exist under those conditions—how our concept would change if things changed 
radically. We are being asked whether we are able to apply our concept as we understand it 
                                                          
2 As a result, I am not at all sure that I am committed to the ‘brain cause’ view of psychological continuity that Wagner says I insist 
upon (20). At the same time, I am very much a materialist and dispute only a few of the things he has to say about the relationship 




now to a situation where a particular condition no longer obtains. This is not something 
impossible to predict, unlike the answer to Wilkes’s question. We either respond readily, or 
we do not, just as when we read science fiction. I called Wilkes’s emphasis on what we would 
say in the situation (rather than what we say about it) the error of mistaking us for them. 
 
The second error I referred to as that of mistaking thought experiments as confirmers. 
Williams (1970, 179–180) rejects body-swap thought experiments like Locke’s3 on the 
grounds that there are other possible outcomes similar to that envisaged which create 
difficulties for a psychological continuity theory of identity, and which the thought 
experimenter suppresses. I argued that this strategy only has any teeth if thought 
experiments are understood as (somehow conclusively) showing a theory to be true. If 
there are thought experiments that create difficulties for the PCT, then a body-swap thought 
experiment with which it is consistent does not show it to be correct. But the point of the 
body-swap case to which Williams objects is to show that having the same body is not a 
necessary condition for being the same person. This consequence still stands even if there are 
other arguments against the PCT and so Williams’s case misses the mark. And I suggested 
that the idea that thought experiments could show a theory to be true is simply implausible: 
telling a story that is consistent with a theory only illustrates it—it provides no more 
confirmation for that theory than for any other theory consistent with the story. Where 
thought experiments have their teeth is in showing theories to be false—as being 
inconsistent with our conceptual scheme. The damage caused by Williams’s body-swap 
thought experiment to his own theory that bodily continuity is necessary for identity 
stands. 
 
I suggested that Wilkes’ and others’ insistence that thought experimental scenarios are 
usually hopelessly under-specified rests on a similar mistake. As we have seen, she thinks that 
once the detail required for us to respond adequately to them is supplied, they become 
incomprehensible. The detail is needed to “establish the phenomenon” to which they appeal. 
But establishing the phenomenon in detail is only required if the experiment is to provide 
evidence for a theory (otherwise detail is only required, for heuristic purposes, to assist 
those people who cannot understand what they are being asked to imagine4). To show it false, 
we only need an instance where we apply our concepts in ways that the theories say we 
cannot. As long as no deep impossibilities are being hidden by a thin description, then no 
elaborate detail is needed to achieve this end. 
 
Is the first mistake really a mistake? 
Wagner denies that either of these is actually a methodological mistake. As to the first one, 
he contends that we do indeed need to know all of the social details that Wilkes demands if 
we are to get to what we think about persons and their identity. What I have got wrong is to 
assume that the concept of person exists in a vacuum and to take this “to assume that 
personhood would not be a different concept if it were shaped by vastly unlike 
                                                          
3 He does not reject brain-transplant thought experiments, only those that use another mechanism like a brain-state transfer device to get 
the psychology from one body to another 




circumstances” (21).I have adopted a view that there are certain intrinsic person-constitutive 
features that hold across all possible worlds, ignoring the importance of the relational and 
social nature of persons and how personhood is embedded in particular social practices. 
That I ultimately draw the conclusion that personal identity is a matter of intrinsic 
(psychological) features means that I am actually begging the question (22). 
 
The details Wilkes demands, he suggests, are all-important: 
 
If the social ontology of personhood was vastly different in a possible world, then there is 
little to gain for an investigation of “our” concept of a person. And so, universities and 
marriages and all the other socially constructed observer-dependent facts…work in a 
specific way precisely because they are so closely tied to our social ontological concept of 
personhood. We cannot treat these observer-dependent facts as though they were observer 
independent, facts holding across all possible worlds. Marriages and universities in a world in 
which splitting is commonplace would potentially be unlike ours in a great many different 
ways because the underlying concept of a person would be significantly different. Perhaps in 
such a world your split sister was also married to your husband and your split brother was 
also allowed to take your upcoming metaphysics midterm because you were seen as one 
and the same person. The reason, then, for why we need to hear more about the practices 
that people in such a possible world would have is not to know what ‘they’ would think, but 
because we cannot figure out what ‘we’ think without information about the social 
functionality of the transformed beings (Wagner 2016, 21–22). 
 
One aspect of this response is immediately puzzling. This is the charge that I assume that 
the concept person exists in a vacuum and is the same across all possible worlds. It is 
puzzling since that is something I explicitly deny. My claim that it is a mistake to confuse us 
with them rests on the suggestion that their concept might be different from ours, given the 
different circumstances with which they have to cope. Especially in circumstances radically 
different from ours, beliefs and practices which relate to how a concept is applied are very 
likely to be different. And I acknowledged that we have no adequate way of working out how 
those practices will change, and so are in no position to speak with any authority5 about 
what their concept would be after radical change. But my point was that their concept is not 
what thought experiments are meant to investigate. Thought experiments are after our 
concept and its commitments. And we do not need to have special insight into what people in 
another world would think to find out what we think. To have it spelt out for us what they in 
the scenario think might make it easier for us to apply our concept—as I discussed in what 
they in the scenario think might make it easier for us to apply our conce detail—but it is not a 
requirement for getting to our conceptual commitments. 
 
Even if we did need to know what they would think, Wagner’s contentions do not affect a 
central strand of my case that there is a mistake going on here. This is that Wilkes (and 
                                                          
5 That is, we do not know how people will actually behave should circumstances change radically. But that does not mean we cannot 
stipulate what they think for the purposes of a thought experiment scenario. We do have authority in that sense, and that is enough for 




Wagner and, to a lesser extent, Schechtman) base their misgivings on our inability to predict 
how our concept would be affected by radically different circumstances. The problematic 
thought experiments at which they gesture involve individuals who split all the time—
universities that double in size every few days, spontaneous unpredictable splitting, or your 
split sister being also married to your split husband. These are all very complex (though not 
really all that difficult to understand, and ones that may not really lead to different notions of 
personhood). But that complexity is simply beside the point. A thought experiment of the 
kind in question tries to isolate specific conditions—in our case whether being the same 
person requires being the same organism. That needs a case in which we agree that this is the 
same person, but it is not the same organism. The splitting need not be spontaneous, or 
multiple, or involve any change to social institutions or be unpredictable in any way—the 
thought experiment can specify (or describe in detail for the troubled) simple “social 
functionality”. Because of that, the practical difficulties grounded in complexity that all of 
these critics raise are simply not relevant. Schechtman takes the same line as Wagner, 
however: 
 
If we encountered a single instance of doubling we undoubtedly would not know how to 
react, and if it became common we would become different sorts of beings with an entirely 
different (and to me not-yet-imaginable) social organization and another way of life…Such 
beings might come to be, but they will probably not be persons (Schechtman 2014, 164). 
 
But this is hyperbole, and an illustration of my complaint. We can understand a single 
case perfectly well—we react to (the story of) a transplant quite equably. That we might 
actually be troubled if it were to happen does not reflect on what we think now about such a 
case. There is no reason to have to imagine a wildly complicated world in which the 
phenomenon occurs, just as there is no reason why we have to think about splitting being 
common. And the leap to splitters probably not being persons is simply out of order. The 
reasons being suggested here for not taking the relevant thought experiments seriously are 
not close to being adequate to the task. 
 
Is the second mistake really a mistake? 
Wagner also takes issue with what I called the mistake of seeing thought experiments as 
confirmers. Their role as I outlined it is to undermine strong claims made by particular 
theories. He suggests I present no positive argument for this view, that it is a highly 
idiosyncratic one, and that it can even be seen as self-defeating. 
 
Let me begin with the charge of idiosyncrasy. According to Wagner, this is because my 
view of thought experiments as refuters would only apply if theories of personal identity 
were making claims of necessity. This, he suggests is not the case—not all of them are 
committed to necessity claims (Wagner 2016, 23). I only erroneously think they do because 




that I make that assumption.6 That aside, the theories that I suggested in my paper were 
affected by the thought experiments under discussion—those of Williams, Olson and 
Schechtman—all do make necessity claims. Williams thinks that continuity of body is 
necessary for identity; Olson thinks the same of being a continuing human organism. 
Schechtman’s theory has a very different feel to it, but even she is offering, in her Person Life 
View (PLV), a theory that she stresses is a metaphysical one and which makes claims very 
like necessity claims. The PLV is the view that to be the same person is to continue to live the 
same person life. Person life is a cluster concept, comprising psychological, biological and 
social continuities which usually function together and no one of which is itself necessary 
for survival if the other two are in place. But that does not mean she is not making 
necessity claims—two of them must be in place. In fact she actually does require one of them 
in all cases (and perhaps in all them must be in plac worlds). She writes: 
 
it is essential to the judgment that a person survives a “whole-body transplant” that the 
transplant product is able to pick up the thread of the life of the person who enters 
surgery. This can happen only if the transplant product is accorded the appropriate place in 
person-space; that is, if she is treated as…the continuation of the original locus of concern 
(Schechtman 2014, 152, my italics). 
 
Her view on how thought experiments work is different from mine, as I described in the 
original paper, but this does not mean she is avoiding claims of necessity. In her view, once the 
case stipulates that the person who results from the transfer is treated as and responds as 
the original person the implication that the cerebrum donor survives as the whole body 
recipient follows immediately (Schechtman 2014, 153). If that implication follows 
immediately, then we are dealing with something very like a claim of necessity—like 
enough to necessity to make my account relevant. 
 
What might be unusual about my theory is that others think that thought experiments are in 
the business of establishing necessity claims. Jonathan Ichikawa and Benjamin Jarvis write, 
“On our view, intuitions [in response to thought experiments] are judgments of necessity, 
and we see no in principle objection to the idea that we can know them a priori” (Ichikawa 
and Jarvis 2009, 223). George Bealer thinks that they “present themselves as necessary” 
(Bealer 1998, 207). But a single case can never establish necessity. That does not need any 
argument. And it does not seem to me that the claim that thought experiments do not offer 
significant positive confirmation of a theory needs much more. A single experiment at most 
offers a little confirmation of a theory in other fields. It also confirms every other theory 
consistent with the experimental result. A story offers less confirmation than that, and also 
confirms to the same degree every other theory consistent with the story. Thought experiments 
only become interesting to the argument once they threaten a theory, and that is exactly my 
point that they function as refuters.7 
 
                                                          
6 Although it is very widely held to be a fundamental principle that identity must be intrinsic—cf. Noonan (1989, 152 and 164), 
Williams (1960, 45—at least according to Parfit 1984, 267), and early Schechtman (1996, 31). 




Wagner sees my view as a denial of any positive role for thought experiments, despite 
my insistence that that they offer indirect support for a theory by undermining rivals. All 
theories of identity, he says, have faced fanciful cases that have indicated problems in them. 
“This, however, has been done in order to support a rival view by showing that this view 
does not suffer from problems in the scenario” (Wagner 2016, 23). That is exactly my view 
on what they can do: it goes without saying that for it to offer indirect support for your 
theory, your theory must be consistent with the thought experiment. To propose a thought 
experiment which destroyed your own theory in your efforts to counter your opponent would 
be a most rash strategy indeed. 
 
Wagner suggests my view of thought experiments being primarily refuters makes them 
pointless: “I am unaware of any theory that has not been haunted by dubious counter 
examples” (23). But this argument turns on the thought experiments involved being dubious 
ones, and that all problems are of equal weight. That will not work as a reply here—the 
thought experiments on which I focused are the critics’ own ones, raising problems that they 
acknowledge need solving.8 
 
The charge of my method being self-defeating is as follows. A thought experiment can 
count against a theory and indirectly in support of another only if the second theory is better 
able to deal with the scenario. “But then the thought experiment serves to confirm the 
theory, and Beck does not want to have it that way” (Wagner 2016, 23). But that is exactly 
how Beck does want to have it and how he has set the method out—it is just that that 
confirmation does not offer much positive support, unless the confirmed theory were the 
only one that could possibly deal with the scenario. That might be the case in some instance, 
but would need much further argument9 and remains in line with my account of the 
method as turning on refutation. Thought experiments only become interesting once they 
reveal a problem. 
 
Wagner ends his case here by reading me as implying that transplant cases support the PCT 
by counting against all theories other than the PCT (23).But that bears no relation to any 
argument of mine. I only suggested that such cases count against two theories, and I think 
that there are many considerations other than these cases that count in favour of the PCT. 
 
The implausibility and impossibility of my transplant 
I detected both of my “mistakes” occurring in Schechtman’s use of a transplant thought 
experiment, and then presented a development of her transplant case that I argued counted 
against her Person Life View (while the PCT could cope happily with it). Hers is a detailed 
story: 
 
                                                          
8 Olson goes to great lengths to reject the force of the transplant on the grounds that reasoning from it to the falsity of his view requires 
reliance on an inference from moral responsibility to identity that holders of the PCT cannot make because of their commitment to 
fission arguments (1997, Ch 3); to no avail, as I argue in Beck (2004). 
9 Just as Locke has to go on to argue that his prince and cobbler case does not provide equal confirmation to identity being a matter of 




Sometime in the future an environmental toxin reaches levels at which it begins to regularly 
cause liver failure in a large segment of the population. A technique is developed to clone 
healthy livers from an individual’s own tissue, transplant techniques are improved, and liver 
transplants become common. Later the toxin begins to attack other organs, and these are 
regularly cloned and transplanted as well. Eventually, it attacks all tissue but the cerebrum 
(which is somehow protected). Fortunately, cloning technology has developed to the point 
where healthy whole organisms can regularly be cloned. Moreover, the development of 
clones can be accelerated and directed so that the result is an adult human body that looks 
almost exactly like the individual from whom the genetic material was taken, but which 
lacks a cerebrum. The cerebrum of the diseased individual is then placed into the cerebrum- 
less skull of the cloned human, carrying with it the individual’s beliefs, values, desires, 
memories and so on. This operation inevitably and immediately leads to the end of the 
biological life of the organism that used to contain the cerebrum. Everyone refers to this 
operation as a “full body transplant” and sees it as the limiting case of the transplantation of 
individual organs. Just as it is assumed that a person survives when she gets a new liver or 
kidney or heart, it is assumed that a person survives when she gets a new body (or, strictly 
speaking, cerebrum-complement). After post-surgical recovery the patient typically returns 
to her family, friends, job and hobbies (Schechtman 2014, 151–152). 
 
Her PLV yields the judgement that, since the recipient of the cerebrum has both 
psychological and social continuities, they continue the person life and so survive, despite 
the lack of biological continuity. She acknowledges that there may be a problem for her 
view concerning the donor organism which continues to exist, since it is in an analogous 
situation to a patient with advanced dementia—who the PLV would also count as continuing 
the person life and so surviving. She has a response to this, as I described. But I put forward a 
different possible development which I thought was more difficult to cope with. 
 
Consider a society in which a cerebrum transplant operation occurs. The cerebrum of a 
person, with their fully developed psychology is transplanted into another body, leaving 
her original body as a living organism with whatever support it requires to function in a 
minimal way as before. This society sees this organism as the original person and treats her 
accordingly, just as they treat someone who has lost her capacities and is in very advanced 
dementia. They ignore the troublesome individual who keeps turning up at the hospital 
entreating them to take notice of her. They are firm in the belief that that they are acting 
correctly and eventually resort to a restraining order against this annoyance. According to 
the PLV there is no problem, since there is only one individual who takes up the original 
person life and who is the subject of the required social continuity and has one of the other 
two continuities, the biological one. But, of course, there is a problem (Beck 2014, 198). 
 
In line with my account of thought experiments, I contended that the onus would be on the 
critic to show that the development I had introduced to Schechtman’s thought experiment 
concealed some deep problem, or otherwise the PLV’s counterintuitive verdict would count 
against the theory. Wagner takes up the challenge: “The seeming force against the ‘Person 





Before looking at what Wagner believes these deep problems are, a point I made at the 
outset should be revisited. This was that the thought experiments that formed the focus of 
my paper were not my ones, but ones outlined by those critical of the theory I favour and 
aspects of its methods. Rather than take on the particular development of a transplant case 
that I have outlined, Wagner argues against the assumptions of transplant thought 
experiments in general. That is perfectly acceptable as a philosophical move outside of this 
dialectical context, but hardly fair as a response to my particular paper. When he sets out the 
“false assumptions” that I make he is taking on assumptions that those to whom I was 
responding had granted me by making them themselves. They amount to common cause. In 
the context of the argument, what is required is isolation of impossibilities only I and not 
the other users of transplant thought experiments have assumed. Nothing meeting that 
description is ultimately to be found in his response. 
 
That being said, I do not agree that any of us are guilty of the charges laid, or that our 
scenario is as confused as Wagner would have it. 
 
The first mistaken assumption of my transplant that he identifies is that I grant the 
cerebrum traditional features of the soul. “What is presupposed…is a conception of the 
psychological subject as a discrete and unified object located within the brain and as such (at 
least in principle) removable from the rest of the body” (Wagner 2016, 25). What this 
presupposition ignores is how cognition depends on far more of the body than just the brain, 
even though the brain is pivotal in maintaining your psychology. He outlines how 
Schechtman in an earlier paper (1997) pointed to a “Distributed View” where the brain is seen 
in cognition as the heart is seen in circulation—as the central organ at the core of a system 
distributed throughout the entire organism. There is thus no clear-cut distinction to be made 
between the brain and body as the transplant requires (25). 
 
Empirical evidence backs up how important bodily features are to how we navigate the 
world and how they impact our distinctive psychology. Our immune systems distinguish 
between our and other tissue, and rejection has been observed in brain tissue transplants. 
This means we cannot expect psychology to be transplanted with a cerebrum. What I have 
done wrong is to submit to a wishful “impulse to impose conceptions of the mind formed 
within the context of dualism onto a materialist ontology” (Wagner 2016, 25). 
 
In dismissing this latter impulse, Wagner appears to have forgotten his own views about 
the importance of the social ontology in which the conceptual genesis of personhood takes 
place. The genesis of our concept of personhood is very much in a context where dualism is 
a possibility. To rule out, as conceptually impossible, disembodied minds is to choose to 
investigate a notion of mind and personhood that is by no means a common one. Nor is that 
common understanding of mind obviously at odds with a materialist ontology: the task of 
the materialist is to locate the concept of mind with all of its quirks—or as many of them as 
can be consistently retained—in a physical world. It is worth noting that arch-materialist David 




disembodied existence—precisely because that is part of the concept that he is trying to locate 
in the material world (Armstrong 1993, 19–20). Not all of that inheritance may be 
redeemable: there are aspects we may have to give up as having no place in reality or as 
conceptually mistaken—just as the PCT gives up the principle that identity is always what 
matters. 
 
 The empirical evidence that Wagner points to is important, but none of it marks the 
transplant scenario as impossible. Our cognition relies (in actuality) on all sorts of 
relationships between brain and body. As he says, our distinctive psychologies and way of 
making our way through the world are shaped by the bodies we have and the interaction 
between brain and the rest of the body. But, although Wagner is suggesting that my 
psychology is the result of the particular body I have, the evidence presented requires no 
more than a particular type of body—one that is very like mine. To think like I do, I need 
the central organ10 that governs my thought—my cerebrum—and a body that has the same 
sort of relation to my brain as mine does. But that is what transplant thought experiments 
presume: Williams made and resolved all of these points back in “The Self and the Future”, 
and thought experiments nowadays use twins and exactly similar bodies of new matter as 
run-of-the-mill features. Schechtman’s version uses a cloned body. Such a body rules out 
the tissue rejection objection as beside the point (and it was never a conceptual impossibility, 
as Wagner acknowledges (26)). 
 
Is it not important that “Beck and Schechtman do not share the same presuppositions 
when it comes to the cerebrum transplant thought experiment that Beck takes to cause 
trouble for the ‘Person Life View’” (Wagner 2016, 26)? It is not important, because it is not 
true. The Schechtman who rejects the transplant is the Schechtman of 1997, who 
(interestingly) accepts the assumption attributed by Wagner to me that personal identity 
must be a matter of intrinsic features (a point she suggested then that the PCT cannot 
include) (cf. Schechtman 1996, 31). The Schechtman to whom I am responding is that of 
2014 who explicitly shares my presuppositions about the transplant scenario—it is her 
scenario after all, one she uses to argue for (among other things) the superiority of her PLV 
over animalism. The PLV suggests that you do survive the transplant, as we have seen—as 
long as the survivor takes up your place in person-space. Schechtman and I share a view on 
“the closely intertwined relation between brain and body” where Wagner sees a contrast 
(25)— she does not (despite his contention) see a relation between brain and a particular 
body as “crucial in preserving identity” (Wagner 2016, 25). 2014 Schechtman differs with 
me on how many teeth thought experiments have, but not on the presuppositions or even the 
outcome of the transplant. As a result, I cannot see any actual grounds for Wagner’s claim that 
her PLV has an advantage over the PCT. Rather, relying only on her presuppositions, a 
different version of the transplant like that I set out in my paper can be described, in 
response to which the PLV yields a strongly counterintuitive judgment. Unlike the PCT. 
 
                                                          




There is one point that Wagner raises that is specific to my version of the transplant. For 
argument’s sake, he grants that a cerebrum transplant might be successful as envisaged and 
be accompanied by the social circumstances I specified, then goes on to argue that the thought 
experiment would not be useful to my case. 
 
But even if it did happen, one could argue that it is not obvious that those people would be 
wrong in claiming that the original person would be the donor and not the recipient. What 
we would have discovered is not that that is how people in this other world think of things, 
but rather that is how “we” think of things. Take an example: you might say, “If I win the 
lottery I would quit my job in an instant” and then find out, when you do win the lottery that 
you actually do not want to quit. Similarly we might want to say that the recipient of the 
cerebrum would surely be the same person, but if the experiment were performed it might 
turn out that we actually feel differently (Wagner 2016, 26). 
 
However, we do not discover what we think in this way—we discover rather what people 
would think if it were to happen. I am not disputing that changing circumstances can change 
judgements. But that means that we discover what they think, or how thinking would 
change if circumstances were to change. That is exactly my point about distinguishing 
between us and them. We are after our concept—represented in how we think we would 
behave (“what we want to say” in Wagner’s terms) and not after theirs—which might be 
revealed in how those in the circumstances actually behave.11 We may well not be able to 
predict with any accuracy how we would behave if circumstances changed drastically. Our 
intuitions have only representational authority—they reveal at best what we think; they are 
not direct routes to reality and do not have that sort of epistemic authority.12 But it is only 
representational authority on which thought experiments rely, and all that they need to be 















                                                          
11 I say might be revealed, since actual behaviour is not always the best guide to values (survival values or otherwise). The Milgram 
experiments reveal that people are willing to torture others when required to do so by an authority figure. That does not mean that they 
think it is right to torture others simply because someone in a white coat asks you to do so. 
12 This is the thrust of my account of how thought experiments operate and of how they can do so effectively despite our tendencies to 
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